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Recent Case
SECURITIES REGULATION-RULE 1Ob-5ACCOUNTANT'S DERIVATIVE LIABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENCE IN CONDUCTING AN AUDIT UNDER
SECTION 17(a) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,
503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted,421 U.S. 909 (1975).
On June 4, 1968 Leston B. Nay murdered his wife and then committed suicide. Nay, who had been the president of First Securities
Company of Chicago and owner of 92 percent of its stock, revealed
in a suicide note that he was the author of a fraud involving a
number of First Securities' customers. For approximately 26 years
prior to his death, Nay had maintained private "escrow" accounts
for these investors which promised them a high rate of return., The
suicide note stated that the accounts had been depleted and that
First Securities was bankrupt due to Nay's thefts. A number of
lawsuits followed. 2 In Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,3 investors in
Nay's fraudulent escrow accounts brought suit against the public
accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, First Securities' independent public
auditor. The complaint charged Ernst & Ernst with violating section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 and its regulatory
1. Nay promised a return of approximately 12 percent per annum; however,
that amount was later reduced to 9 percent. For a detailed explanation of Nay's
escrow account scheme and other facts surrounding the fraud, see SEC v. First Sec.
Co., 466 F.2d 1035, 1036-37 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981,
982-85 (7th Cir. 1972).
2. See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted,421 U.S. 909 (1975) (civil damages action brought under rule lOb-5); SEC v.
First Sec. Co., 466 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, McKy v. Union Bank & Trust
Co., 409 U.S. 1041 (1972) (equitable receivership proceedings); SEC v. First Sec. Co.,
463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, McKy v. Hochfelder, 409 U.S. 880 (1972)
(equitable receivership proceedings); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 350 F.
Supp. 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1972), afl'd, 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
875 (1975) (civil damages action brought under rule lOb-5 by defrauded investors).
3. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
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corollary, SEC rule lOb-5. The investors alleged that Ernst & Ernst
aided and abetted Nay's rule lOb-5 violation 6 by negligently conducting the annual audits of First Securities which were certified to
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under rule 17a-5.7
Although plaintiffs did not receive any portion of the allegedly defective reports,8 they claimed that had the audits been conducted in
a nonnegligent fashion, Nay's fraud would have been discovered
and Ernst & Ernst would have reported it to the SEC which in turn
would have taken appropriate action to prevent investors' losses.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendant Ernst &
Ernst. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that there were
genuine issues of material fact and remanded to the district court
for a further determination. The court said:
Where, as here, it is urged that the defendant through action as well as inaction has facilitated the fraud of another,
a claim for aiding and abetting is made on demonstrating:
(1) that the defendant had a duty of inquiry; (2) the plaintiff was a beneficiary of that duty of inquiry; (3) the defendant breached the duty of inquiry; (4) concomitant with the
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
6. The Seventh Circuit indicated elsewhere that Nay's conduct "violated the
provisions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its regulatory
corollary, Rule lOb-5." SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
7. SEC rule 17a-5 requires that every broker and dealer in securities file an
annual audited report of their financial condition containing the information required
by Form X-17A-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(a)(2) (1974). As part of the report the independent public accountant must certify that the audit was conducted in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(g)(2)(ii) (1974).
Rule 17a-5 is set forth in pertinent part at note 34 infra.
8. Brief for Appellee at 8, Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted,421 U.S. 909 (1975).
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breach of the duty of inquiry the defendant breached a duty
of disclosure; and (5) there is a causal connection between
the breach of the duty of inquiry and disclosure and the
facilitation of the underlying fraud; that is, adequate inquiry and subsequent disclosure would have led to the discovery of the underlying fraud or its prevention. 9
I.

SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER RULE

lOb-5

Attempts to compartmentalize a defendant's level of participation
in a fraud or scheme actionable under rule lOb-5 have encouraged
the use of theories of "derivative" liability. Liability imposed derivatively originates through the use of various legal concepts borrowed from elsewhere in the law.'0 Because the evolution of rule
lOb-5 has resulted in a partial demise of those elements introduced
to limit liability under the rule's broad language,' great confusion
9. 503 F.2d at 1104.
10. One commentator lists eight such theories, which are: "(1) aiding and
abetting; (2) conspiracy; (3) controlling person liability; (4) beneficial ownership;
(5) principal's responsibility for agent's acts; (6) 'directly or indirectly' language of
[rule lOb-5]; (7) Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act; and (8) a failure to adequately
train and supervise employees." A. JAcoas, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 40.01,
at 2-68 (1974). See generally id. §§ 40.01-.09.
11. The chief elements originally formulated by the courts to limit the civil
liability of rule lob-5 defendants include (1) the "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security" language of the rule, (2) materiality, (3) reliance, (4) privity,
and (5) scienter.
The early Birnbaum doctrine precluded suits brought under rule lOb-5 by persons
not actual purchasers or sellers of securities. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). However, the effect of the Birnbaum decision has been substantially diluted. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-62 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). But see
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 419 U.S. 875 (1975). See generally 2
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 7.6 (1973).
Rule lOb-5 prohibits misrepresentations or omissions of material facts. Applying a
reasonable investor test, courts have generally held that a fact is material if a reasonable investor might consider it important when making the decision to invest. See,
e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). Reliance
is no longer required where a defendant is charged with nondisclosure. The fact that
the defendant failed in his obligation to disclose all material facts itself establishes
causation in fact. Id.
Although some "semblance of privity" was originally required by the courts in a
rule lob-5 damages action, this element is no longer a prerequisite to recovery. Thus,
purchasers and sellers on the national securities exchanges may sue without establishing that there was a face-to-face transaction with the defendant. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), afl'd, 945 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
259 F. Supp. 673, 682-83 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp.
702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits), afld, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970).
Unlike the other elements, a uniform concept of scienter has not been developed
and the application of the standard has varied among the circuits. See notes 48-76
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has arisen when assigning liability to the level of participation of a
given defendant. As Professor Bromberg remarks: "We must admit
that the lines which divide participation, aiding-abetting and conspiring are indistinct and, worse, that notions may subsequently
overlap. To a considerable extent, it is a pleader's choice or 12a
judge's. The facts, not the label, should determine the outcome."
As courts deemphasize each element needed to establish common law
fraud and extend rule lOb-5 liability to situations where it is absent,
the task of distinguishing primary and secondary liability under the
rule becomes increasingly difficult.

A.

White v. Abrams

In White v. Abrams,13 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took a different tack when considering liability under rule lOb-5.
Rather than compartmentalize conduct under rule lOb-5 by applying standards of traditional common law fraud, the White court applied a flexible standard hinging on an examination of (1) the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's access
to information compared with the plaintiff's access, (3) the benefit
that the defendant derives from the relationship, (4) the reliance of
the plaintiff, and (5) the defendant's role in initiating the securities
transaction in question.14 This approach looks to a duty, derived
from the above factors, that rule lOb-5 imposes upon those persons
connected with the purchase or sale of securities. The approach
rejects the notion that a plaintiff must prove fraud in order to recover.' 5 The court stated:
The standard we have set forth here does not impose absolute liability for misrepresentations regardless of a person's
knowledge of falsity. It rejects the use of latin terms which
obfuscate the rule and confuse the result. It rejects the
idea that conduct in complex rule lOb-5 cases may be neatly
compartmentalized into traditional concepts which have
often resulted in jamming facts together in an effort to fit
the concept. While rejecting scienter and state of mind
concepts as the standard itself, it requires the court to coninfra and accompanying text. See generally 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD § 8.4 (1973).
12. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITiES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5 (515), at 208.5 (1973).
13. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
14. Id. at 735.
15. See Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951).
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sider state of mind as an important factor
6 in determining
the scope of duty that rule lOb-5 imposes.
The White court also attempted to sweep aside confusion caused by
differentiation between primary and secondary involvement by discarding the theories of liability which make such distinctions. The
issue of aiding and abetting was not explicitly raised because the defendant was the most immediate or most direct violator. However,
the court indicated that the flexible approach eliminates the necessity of creating a "pigeonhole for each defendant whose involvement
in the transaction . . may not fit nicely into one of the previously
7
defined classes."'
B.

Aiding and Abetting

The plaintiffs in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst alleged that there
has been an aiding and abetting violation of rule l0b-5. 8 As one
theory of derivative liability used in securities law, aiding and abetting finds its origin in the provisions of the criminal law and in the
law of torts. The SEC first introduced the theory of aider-abettor
liability in its disciplinary' 9 and injunctive 0 proceedings, where it
sought to analogize criminal aider-abettor provisions21 and impose
liability based on such concepts. In SEC v. Timetrust, Inc.,22 the
court stated: "The present suit seeking injunctive relief, sounds in
fraud, and is similar in many respects to a criminal prosecution ....
Persons charged with aiding and abetting a criminal offense . . .
may be joined as defendants, and no good reason appears why this
same rule should not apply in an injunctive proceeding ....
16. 495 F.2d at 736.
17. Id. at 734 (footnote omitted).
18. Because aiding and abetting and conspiracy are easily confused, it is important to note the distinction between the two concepts. Justice Rutledge, speaking
in the context of the criminal law, ably points out the variation: "The gist of conspiracy is the agreement; that of aiding, abetting or counseling is in consciously advising
or assisting another to commit particular offenses, and thus becoming a party to them;
[the gist of] substantive crime, going a step beyond mere aiding, abetting, counseling
to completion of the offense." Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 649 (1946)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
19. See, e.g., Southeastern Sees. Corp., 29 S.E.C. 609, 617 (1949); Burley & Co.,
23 S.E.C. 461, 464 (1946).
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 909 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
21. The federal criminal aider-abettor provision provides: "Whoever commits
an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1970). This
type of aider-abettor liability "is well engrained in the law." Nye & Nissen v. United
States, 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949).
22. 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
23. Id. at 43.
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Later, defrauded investors began to use the aider-abettor theory to
reach persons who were not actual participants in the fraudulent
sale or exchange. 24 When imposing aider-abettor liability in these
early damage actions, courts cited tort law antecedents 25 as well as
precedent established by the SEC2 6 to support their holdings.
Although the aider-abettor theory has progressed in its application to securities law from criminal actions to injunctive proceedings
and ultimately to private damages actions, each type of proceeding
is distinctive. Accordingly, the context of the theory's application
becomes important. An injunctive proceeding is characterized by its
equitable and prophylactic goals; no direct pecuniary loss or criminal sanction is inflicted upon the defendant unless the SEC requests
ancillary relief. For this reason a court may require defendants to
meet higher standards of care, enjoining future activity based on
past conduct and participation which would be insufficient to justify
imposition of civil or criminal penalties. In a criminal proceeding,
the focus lies on a defendant's state of mind, where a higher level
of knowledge must be shown to justify the imposition of fines or
other criminal penalties. Thus, the standards of conduct which a
defendant will be required to meet may be dependent upon the type
27
of relief sought by the plaintiff.
It has been noted that aider-abettor liability acts as a natural and
logical compliment to a private right of action under rule lOb-5,
24. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on
merits), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
25. The tort law aider-abettor provision is set forth in section 876 of the Restatement of Torts.
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, a person is liable if he
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions
under which the act is done or intending the consequences which
ensue, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes
a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939). See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins.
Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702
(N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits, aft'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
989 (1970).
26. A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 40.02, at 2-9 (1974).
27. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973); Landy v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3rd Cir. 1973); Mutual Shares v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967). See also ALI FED. SEC. CODE §
1418(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973); Id. §§ 1507, 1517, 1704, 1704 Comment 4 (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1974).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:252

allowing the courts to fulfill best the purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.28 Certainly, the theory serves a function
similar to that which it serves elsewhere in the law; it closes off
avenues of escape under the statute to those persons who lend assistance to the commission of the primary wrong and who are as
culpable as the primary violator, but who are not direct or immediate participants in the prohibited activity. The theory thereby protects the investor to the fullest extent. The American Law Institute
includes an aider-abettor provision within its proposed Federal Securities Code29 which is adapted from section 876(b) of the Restatement of Torts.3 0 The Restatement provision was drafted to deal
with physical harm, not the duties and responsibilities attributable
to individuals associated with the securities marketplace. Professor
Ruder has criticized the application of tort doctrines in securities
law and commented specifically that "the section offers little helpful
analysis and properly should be rejected as an independent source
of liability under the securities laws.'

28. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D.
Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits),
affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
29. Section 1418(b) of the proposed FederalSecurities code provides:
(b) [Aiders and abettors.] (1) An agent or other person who substantially assists or induces conduct by another person (herein a "principal")
giving rise to liability under this Code (as defined in section 217A and except
for section 1413) with knowledge or reasonable ground to believe that that
conduct is the kind specified in section 1418(a)(1) is liable to the same
extent as the principal.
(2) A person is not liable under section 1418(b)(1) for conduct by a
principal that is actionable under section 1404, 1405(b), 1406, or 1407 unless
the misrepresentation is known by that person (within the meaning of
section 251A) to be a misrepresentation.
ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1418(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973). Section 251A of
the Code is set forth at note 49 infra.
Section 1418(b) is being renumbered and changed to read:
(b) [Aiders and abettors.] (1) An agent or other person who causes,
commands, induces, procures, or gives substantial assistance to conduct
by another person (herein a "principal") giving rise to liability under this
Code (as defined in section 217A and except for section 1413) with knowledge that that conduct is the kind specified in section 1419(a)(1) is liable
to the same extent as the principal.
(2) A person is not liable under section 1419(b)(1) for conduct by a
principal that is actionable under section 1404, 1405(b), 1406, or 1407
unless there is proof of that person's scienter as to the misrepresentation.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1704, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974).
30. Professor Loss designates the source of the section as new; however, he
does compare the tort law provision. Section 876(b) of the Restatement of Torts is
set forth at note 25 supra.
31. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding.and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA.
L. REv. 597, 621-22 (1972).
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C. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst
In Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit drew a duty directly from the 1934 Act.32 Although
the Ernst & Ernst court paid lipservice to the White v. Abrams approach, it held that section 17(a)33 and SEC rule 17a-5 34 promul32. Previously, courts have recognized a duty under section 6 of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970). See Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1975); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217
F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970). Section 17(a) provides:
(a) Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every
broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium
of any such member, every registered securities association, and every
broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 78o of this title, shall
make, keep, and preserve for such periods, such accounts, correspondence,
memoranda, papers, books, and other records, and make such reports,
as the Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other
records shall be subject at any time or from time to time to such reasonable
periodic, special, or other examinations by examiners or other representatives of the Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1974). Rule 17a-5 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Filing reports. (1) This rule shall apply to every member of a
national securities exchange who transacts a business in securities directly
with or for others than members of a national securities exchange, every
broker or dealer (other than a member) who transacts a business in
securities through the medium of any member of a national securities
exchange, and every broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 15 of
the act.
(2) Every member, broker or dealer subject to this rule shall file
reports of financial condition containing the information required by Form
X-17A-5, as follows: (i) a report shall be filed as of a date within each
calendar year ....
(b) Nature and form of reports. Each report of financial condition
filed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section shall be prepared and filed
in accordance with the following requirements:
(1) The report of a member, broker or dealer shall be certified by a
certified public accountant or a public accountant who shall be in fact independent ....
(2) Attached to the report shall be an oath or affirmation that, to the
best knowledge and belief of the person making such oath or affirmation,
(i) the financial statement and supporting schedules are true and correct
and (ii) neither the member, broker, or dealer, nor any partner, officer, or
director, as the case may be, has any proprietary interest in any account
classified solely as that of a customer . ...
(g) Accountant's certificate-(1) Technical requirements. The accountant's certificate shall be dated, shall be signed manually, and shall
identify without detailed enumeration the items of the report covered by
the certificate.
(2) Representations as to audit. The accountant's certificate (i) shall
contain a reasonably comprehensive statement as to the scope of the audit
made, including a statement as to whether the accountant reviewed the
procedures followed for safeguarding the securities of customers and
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gated thereunder were the source of Ernst & Ernst's duty under rule
lOb-5.
The Ernst & Ernst court found that rule 17a-5 imposed a double
duty upon the independent public accountant: the duty to make inquiries into the financial status of the broker-dealer by performing
the various tasks set forth in Form X-17A-535 and the duty to disclose fully his findings as part of the audit. In addition, the auditor must certify to the SEC that the audit was performed in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.36 The court
indicated that a defrauded investor cannot enforce the common law
duty of inquiry raised by the audit contract by suing as a third party
beneficiary 37 and that other professional obligations by themselves
including, if with respect to significant items in the report covered by the
certificate any auditing procedures generally recognized as normal have been
omitted, a specific designation of such procedures and of the reasons
for their omission, (ii) shall state whether the audit was made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards applicable in the circumstances; and (iii) shall state whether the audit made omitted any procedure
deemed necessary by the accountant under the circumstances of the particular
case.
(3) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to imply authority for the
omission of any procedure which independent accountants would ordinarily
employ in the course of an audit made for the purpose of expressing the
opinions required by paragraph (h) of this section.
(i) Accountant's certificate; exceptions. Any matters to which the
accountant takes exception shall be clearly identified; the exception thereto
shall be specifically and clearly stated; and, to the extent practicable, the
effect of each such exception on the related item of the report shall be
given.
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(a)(2) (1974); 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 33,921 (1974).
Form X-17A-5 provides in part:
The audit shall be made in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards and shall include a review of the accounting system, the internal
accounting control and procedures for safeguarding securities including
appropriate tests thereof for the period since the prior examination date.
It shall include all procedures necessary under the circumstances to substantiate the assets and liabilities and securities and commodities positions
as of the date of the responses to the financial questionnaire and to permit
the expression of an opinion by the independent public accountant as to the
financial condition of the respondent at that date.
Id. 33,938, at 22,813-14 (1974).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(g) (1974).
37. 503 F.2d at 1107, citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931).
Prior to the Ultramares decision the law of New York was otherwise. In
Glanzer v. Shepherd, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), the highest court of the State
of New York departed from traditional contract theories by imposing liability for
damages caused to a third party by the negligent performance of a contract. Previously, an injured third party, not in privity, had no redress in the courts. Liability
had been imposed elsewhere for tangible physical harm to third parties. See, e.g.,
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916). Judge Cardozo,
speaking for the Glanzer court, indicated that the duty which gave rise to plaintiffs
right of recovery was not exclusively contractual, but rather that it was imposed by law.
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fail to provide the investor with a remedy. 38 However, the court
held that, unlike the common law and professional duties, Ernst &
Ernst's statutory duty under rule 17a-5 could be enforced by the
escrow plaintiffs. 39 Aider-abettor liability arises where the defrauded investor can show that (1) the accountant breached a duty
of inquiry owed to the investor, (2) the defendant breached a duty
of disclosure concomitant with the breach of the duty of inquiry,
and (3) there is a causal link between the breach of the duties of
inquiry and disclosure which facilitated the underlying fraud.40
This test creates a right of action resulting in secondary liability
imposed by the aider-abettor theory under rule lOb-5. The court
avoided the question of whether a direct duty flowing to investors
is implicit in section 17(a) and rule 17a-5 by stating that "it is enough
for the purposes of proving defendant's aid and abetment of a
rule lOb-5 violation that the extant duty of inquiry imposed on
Ernst & Ernst is grounded on a concern for the protection of investors such as plaintiffs.' 1

Glanzer v. Shepherd, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922). Nine years after
Glanzer the court in Ultramares refused to extend the scope of liability for intangible
economic damages brought about by an accountant's negligence to all foreseeable
injuries resulting to third parties. The Ultramares case involved public accountants
who negligently performed the terms of an audit contract thereby causing economic
damages to reliant third parties. Discussing the wisdom .of imposing a duty owed to
all those who might foreseeably rely on negligently prepared statements, Judge
Cardozo stated:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an indetetrminant amount for an indeterminant
time to an indeterminant class. The hazards of a business conducted on
these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not
exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to those consequences.
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). However, the Ultramares court did not overrule Glanzer, thus leaving the potential for
liability to third parties where their reliance was known specifically to the accountant. The Ultramares decision sets the bounds of an accountant's common law duty
by establishing that there is no duty owed to all persons who might foreseeably rely.
Only in recent years has the impact of Ultramares somewhat diminished. Embracing the philosophy of Glanzer, several courts have extended liability to those
members of a limited class whose reliance on financial statements actually was
foreseen. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, 455 F.2d 847,
851 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
Nevertheless, the Ernst & Ernst court aligns itself with the position taken in Ultramares that the defrauded investors cannot successfully assert a common law duty
of inquiry.
38. See notes 111-13 infra and accompanying text.
39. 503 F.2d at 1105.
40. For the exact elements needed to state a cause of action as articulated by the
court, see text accompanying note 9 supra.
41. 503 F.2d at 1105.
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lOb-5

Aider-abettor liability under rule lOb-5 and the compartmentalized analysis which it fosters has led to several restrictions which
immunize certain conduct from civil sanctions under the rule. To
recover under the aider-abettor theory, a plaintiff must establish the
alleged aider-abettor's participation in the prohibited activity either
through active participation or through some set of circumstances
tantamount to active participation. In addition, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant acted or failed to act with some level of
personal fault-scienter.
A.

Action versus Inaction

Where defrauded investors seek civil damages for violation of
rule lOb-5, mere inaction may not justify the imposition of aiderabettor liability if a defendant has no duty of disclosure. When
used in the traditional sense, aid and abetment connotes help, assistance, or facilitation lent to the scheme of the primary wrongdoer.
The concept requires the existence of a primary wrong, although the
primary violator need not be joined in the action or even known by
the plaintiff.42 Most courts recognize that aid and abetment may
occur through inaction as well as affirmative conduct and accordingly
have not limited liability to cases where only affirmative conduct was
present. 43 The district court in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
Insurance Co., 44 one of the major cases involving aider-abettor liability, pointed out:
To rest the definition of aiding and abetting solely on abstract and mechanical distinctions between active and passive assistance or to hold blindly that silence and inaction
cannot constitute aiding and abetting under any possible
set of circumstances would be to defeat and hamper the
intelligent and responsible development of the law by subjecting it to a tyranny of labels.45
Often positive assistance takes the form of inaction. By doing nothing or by walking away from a transaction, a defendant may allow
a rule lOb-5 violation to remain undiscovered and thereby injure
those defrauded. In some cases, silence may represent a defendant's
42. A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 40.02, at 2-72 & nn. 20-21 (1974).
43. See, e.g., Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973); Anderson v.
Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Minn. 1968).
44. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp.
702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
45. 259 F. Supp. at 682.
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approval and may encourage the wrongdoer or facilitate the continued success of his scheme." Thus, one may render substantial
assistance to a primary violator by simply doing nothing.
The imposition of aider-abettor liability on a defendant for nonfeasance is contingent on the presence of a duty to the investing
public requiring that he take action. In all cases imposing liability
for inaction, courts have found such a duty of disclosure.47 This
duty is triggered by the aider-abettor's special relationship with
the investing public. Because courts have limited their holdings in
many decisions to the facts before them, the exact nature of the obligations imposed by this duty of disclosure or of those upon whom
they fall remains somewhat unclear.
B.

Knowledge and Constructive Knowledge-Scienter

Under section 876(b) of the Restatement of Torts a person is
liable for harm caused by the tortious conduct of another if he gives
substantial assistance or encouragement knowing that such conduct
constitutes a breach of duty. 48 The American Law Institute also
includes knowledge as a component necessary for the imposition of
aider-abettor liability under the proposed Federal Securities Code.49
Stated generally in the context of securities fraud, a defendant
charged with aiding and abetting "must have some general awareness that his role is part of a complex activity and that the overall
46. For example, in the Brennan case the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit stated: "We find that under all the facts and circumstances of this case, Midwestern's actions amounted to a tacit agreement with Dobich . . . facilitating the
fraud and allowing Dobich's scheme to continue to Midwestern's benefit." Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970). For further discussion of the Brennan case, see notes 108-19
infra and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974);
Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973). Compare Fischer v. Kletz, 266
F. Supp. 180, 194-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), with Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Il1. 1967).
48. See note 25 supra. The knowledge requirement is actually a double one:
(I) knowledge of the primary violator's conduct, and (2) knowledge that the primary
violator's conduct is wrong. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5(582),
at 208.43 (1973).
49. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1418(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973), quoted at note 29
supra. The definition of knowledge is set forth in section 251A of the Code which
provides:
[Knowledge.] When reference is made to this section, a misrepresentation
is known by a person to be a misrepresentation if he (a) knows or believes
that the matter is otherwise than represented, (b) does not have the confidence in its existence or nonexistence that he expresses or implies, or (c)
knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies he has for his
belief.
Id. § 251A.
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conduct is in some way improper."5 ° This quantum of mindfulness
or awareness of the wrongdoing has been christened "scienter" by
the courts. Its exact definition is not subject to ready explanation,
in fact, the term has caused such confusion that some have suggested
that its use be discontinued. 5' The element itself may vary in definition as well as in application from wilfulness to simple negligence.52 Where courts adhere to traditional compartmentalized
treatment of conduct under rule lOb-5, scienter, a requisite in common law fraud, also has been retained as a necessary ingredient
of aider-abettor liability.
Language does exist indicating that aider-abettor liability may b e
imposed for something less than actual knowledge and participation
in the primary wrong. For example, plaintiffs have argued that
knowledge of a primary wrong should be attributed to aider-abettor
defendants through a "should have known" standard." Whether
this precedent provides a sound basis for liability absent actual
knowledge is not clear.
In SEC v. First Securities Co.,5 4 investors defrauded by Leston
50. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5(582), at 208.45 (1973).
Similar language appears in SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189,
195 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
51. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 728 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974); see 2 A. BROMEERG,
SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.4(503), at 204.102-.103 (1973).
See also Bucklo,
Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 567-71 (1972); Mann, Rule lob-5:
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrasesof Negligence and
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206, 1207-09 (1970).
52. Professor Ruder outlines five categories into which the conduct or inaction
of a rule lOb-5 defendant may fall: (1) wilfulness or intent to injure the plaintiff, (2)
knowing misrepresentation or omission where there is no intent to injure, (3) reckless
misrepresentations-representations made without reason to believe in their truth or
accuracy, (4) negligent misrepresentations or omissions, and (5) innocent misrepresentations or omissions. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and
State of Mind in Rule lob-5 Purchaseand Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423, 436-37
(1968). Because the various philosophies underlying the rule do not suggest the same
result, courts have not been uniform in their adoption of a standard of conduct. It
is generally agreed that wilfulness need not be established to impose liability and that
innocent conduct does not give rise to a private right of action for damages. Courts
do agree that knowing or reckless misrepresentation or omission constitutes a violation of the rule. In addition, the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
have adopted a negligence standard in private damage actions. See A. JACOBS,
THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 63 (1973).
53. See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
410 F.2d 135, 144 (7th Cir. 1969); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp.
189, 195 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp.
673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind.
1968) (on merits), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
54. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Nay asserted their claims against First Securities Company in an
equitable receivership proceeding.

Plaintiffs presented four theories

of liability, one count alleging that First Securities aided and abetted
Nay's rule lOb-5 violation."

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit stated that "liability predicated on aiding and abetting may
be found on less than actual knowledge and participation in the activity prescribed by section 10 and Rule lOb-5." 6 First Securities
made Nay its president, held him out as a successful investment
counselor, and allowed him to enforce a suspect mail rule. 57 Stressing these facts, the, court permitted the escrow plaintiffs to assert
their claims against the brokerage firm, even though First Securities had no actual knowledge of Nay's fraudulent schemes. The
court held for claimants on each of the four theories of liability presented.5
The court compared Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc- 9 and Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance
Co. 60 with the case before it and found the present situation to be

"a far more compelling case for the imposition of liability as an

aider and abettor than either Buttrey or Brennan. 61 In Buttrey,
the plaintiff, trustee in bankruptcy for Dobich Securities Corpora-

tion, brought suit against the defendant brokerage firm charging
that Merrill Lynch "knowingly aided, abetted and assisted Michael
Dobich in violation of . . . SEC Rule lOb-5. 62 The complaint alleged that Merrill Lynch allowed Dobich to open a cash account
in the name of Dobich Securities for the purpose of trading se55. Claimants also presented the following theories of secondary liability: (1)
First Securities was liable as principal for the acts of Nay under the common law apparent authority principle as set forth in sections 261 and 262 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency; (2) First Securities was a "controlling person" with respect to
Nay and is liable under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970); (3) First Securities breached its duty pursuant to rule 27 of
the Rules of Fair Practice of The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
The Seventh Circuit found First Securities liable on each of the claimants' four
theories. 463 F.2d at 986.
56. Id. at 987, citing Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d
135, 144 (7th Cir. 1969). See also note 51 supra and accompanying text.
57. Nay did not allow employees of First Securities to open mail either addressed to him personally or addressed to his attention. When on vacation he instructed that his mail be piled unopened on his desk until he returned. Arguably,
enforcement of this rule constitutes a departure from adequate internal accounting
control. Brief for Appellant at 3-15, Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted,421 U.S. 909 (1975).
58. 463 F.2d at 985-86.
59. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
60. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
61. 463 F.2d at 988.
62. 410 F.2d at 137.
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curities, knowing that Dobich was using money fraudulently converted from his customers. Plaintiffs based their claims on rule 405
of the New York Stock Exchange,6 3 section 17 of the Securities
Act of 1933,64 and rule lOb-5, as well as on aid and abetment of
Dobich's violation of rule lOb-5. After considering the factual allegations, the district court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment. It concluded that the charged violation amounted to "an
almost callous disregard of Rule 405. '' 65
Arguably, Merrill Lynch's conduct involved more than simple
negligence. Here, aider-abettor liability under rule lOb-5 was predicated on a reckless disregard of facts which should have put Merrill Lynch on notice that Dobich was violating rule lOb-5. In Brennan66 the district court held on remand that the defendant, Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., aided and abetted Michael Dobich's
rule lOb-5 violation through affirmative conduct, finding it unnecessary to consider whether silence and inaction alone were sufficient
to impose secondary liability. 67 It is apparent from the court's
detailed and lengthy recitation of the events surrounding Dobich's
violation and Midwestern's role in it that Midwestern's conduct in
assistance and facilitation also amounted to more than simple negligence.68 In First Securities no one knew of or suspected Nay's
63. New York Stock Exchange rule 405 was adopted pursuant to sections 6 and
19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s (1970), and provides:
Every member organization is required through a general partner or an
officer who is a holder of voting stock to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such
organization and every person holding power of attorney over any account
accepted or carried by such organization.
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the organization.
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly
after the completion of any transaction for the account of or with a customer,
provided however, that in the case of branch offices, the opening of an account
for a customer may be approved by the manager of such branch office but
the action of such branch office manager shall within a reasonable time be
approved by a general partner or an officer who is a holder of voting stock in
the organization. The member, general partner or officer approving the
opening of the account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally
informed as to the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature
of the proposed account and shall indicate his approval in writing on a
document which is a part of the permanent records of his office or organization.
2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 2405 (1975).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
65. This portion of the district court's opinion, which was unreported, was
quoted by the court of appeals. 410 F.2d at 141.
66. See notes 108-19 infra and accompanying text.
67. 286 F. Supp. 702, 704 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
68. See id. at 708-24.
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fraud until after his death. Aider-abettor liability in this situation
nonetheless may be justifiable. Permitting Nay to enforce an unusual mail rule perhaps is more than simply negligent; it may constitute recklessness, thereby providing a basis for assessing damages
which complies with more traditional theories of aider-abettor liability. 69 The court, in fact, emphasized the reckless nature of First
Securities' conduct, which weakened the contention that the scienter
test was not met.70 In addition, Nay, as president of First Securities and owner of 92 per cent of its stock, was really the alter
ego of the corporation; as a practical matter the two were one and
the same.
Constructive knowledge is a species of scienter somewhat milder
than actual knowledge. A constructive knowledge standard may be
approximated by tort notions of recklessness; however, in its pure
form, negligence, as applied in tort law, corresponds more accurately. Under the tort standard, a defendant is charged with knowledge
of that which he has failed to learn through a lack of diligence.71
Where a defendant's knowledge is provable by inference, the resulting standard closely resembles constructive knowledge. Yet, the
weight of those decisions purporting to apply a constructive knowledge standard has been diminished by later showings that defendants were actually aware of the primary violator's wrongdoing or
that they acted with reckless disregard for the truth.
Professor Ruder has raised the argument that the scienter requirement for aider-abettor liability under rule lOb-5 should not be
confused with that standard restricting the imposition of primary
liability under the rule, since arguably different policy considerations enter questions of secondary liability. 72 One rationale for this
point of view is that in the great majority of aiding-abetting cases
the defendant simply will be conducting normal business activities.
By lowering the scienter standard for aiders and abettors to negligence, courts would be placing an extreme burden on banks, accountants, lawyers, and others who perform day-to-day services for
corporations.73 Applying a negligence standard to secondary participants ultimately would make them watchdogs and investigators
69. There is general agreement that the scienter test is met when a defendant
makes a statement without belief that it is true or with reckless disregard whether it
be true or false. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text. See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 107, at 701 (4th ed. 1971).
70. See Comment, Civil Liability for Violation of NASD Rules: SEC v. First
Securities Co., 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 388, 389 n.10 (1972).
71. See cases cited at note 53 supra.
72. Ruder, supra note 31, at 631.
73. Id. at 632-33.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:252

rather than agents and servants. Imposition of this type of duty (a
duty to inquire as well as to disclose) may create additional problems for those who already owe certain loyalties to a corporate
client.74 Indeed, it is very clear that where a conflict does arise,
an accountant's duty to the investing public supersedes any obligation he may have to his corporate client.7 5 Past attempts to apply a
"should have known" or negligence standard to aider-abettor defendants have been criticized on these grounds.76
III.

A

AIDING AND ABETTING:

CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS

In the decisions following, the factual patterns and each defendant's involvement in the scheme at issue are of particular importance. The level of participation and knowledge in the alleged
violations are key elements upon which the courts focus. Of particular interest is the issue of whether a duty is to be imposed on the
defendant. In determining this issue, the courts consider factors
such as the defendant's unique position in the transaction or his
possession of special skills, such as accounting or legal ability.
In Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 77 investors were defrauded by one Nevin F. Hench, who, while allegedly unregistered
and unlicensed as a broker, solicited their money for investments in
the commodities market promising returns of up to 6 percent per
year. Plaintiffs' complaint stated that the defendant brokers, Francis
I. duPont & Co. and Louis N. Ritten & Co., allowed Hench to use
their office facilities, endorsed Hench's skill as a trader in commodi-8
7
ties, and held Hench out as "a favored and valuable customer.
The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment,
stating that plaintiffs' allegations based on section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193479 and rule lOb-5, or in the alterna74. See Isbell, An Overview of Accountant's Duties and Liabilities Under the
Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
261 (1974); Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities
Laws: Private Counsellor or Public Servant?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1189 (1973).
75. Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957). See Sonde,
The Responsibilities of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some
Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1973).
76. See, e.g., Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971). But see SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973), where the Second Circuit has expressly rejected this argument as it applies to actions brought for injunctive relief.
For a further discussion of the Spectrum decision, see notes 120-28 infra and accompanying text.
77. 291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
78. Id. at 709.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970), which provides:
(a) Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
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tive on aid and abetment of the violation of rule lOb-5, were sufficient to sustain a cause of action against defendants' motion. 0
Defendants' alleged participation or assistance in Hench's fraudulent
scheme was clear.
The factual context in Sennot v. Rodman & Renshaw8 was similar; however, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
a district court judgment finding the defendant brokerage firm liable for losses caused to investors. Jordan Rothbart, a former associate in the defendant firm, sold to defrauded plaintiffs options
in nonexistent stock. Later, by attempting to make good the losses
to investors caused by the sale of those nonexistent options and to cover
up his son's fraud, William Rothbart, a partner in the defendant
firm, became involved in the rule lOb-5 violations. The court of
appeals held that it could not be said that William Rothbart and his
son were acting as agents of Rodman & Renshaw when engaged
in the fraudulent transactions. Treating the question of agency
implied in fact, the court indicated that plaintiffs' damages were inflicted by their misplaced reliance upon Jordan Rothbart and not
upon Rodman & Renshaw.8 2 Plaintiffs sought to impose controllingperson liability under section 20(a) as well as on the theory of aiding
and abetting Rothbart's rule lOb-5 violation. Rejecting liability on
both theories, the court of appeals held that controlling-person liability extended only to transactions in which the defendant firm was
involved and that the findings of the trial court failed to show that
the defendant's knowledge was sufficient to support the theory of
aider-abettor liability.8 3 Compared with the brokers in the duPont
case, Rodman & Renshaw's participation was slight. They had no
actual knowledge of the wrongdoing, nor did they provide office
facilities for Jordan Rothbart or hold him out as a qualified broker.
On the contrary, he was considered persona non grata by the firm,
despite his father's status as a partner, because of his previous
violations of federal securities law.14 Accordingly, no duty was imposed.
Fischer v. Kletz8 5 involved the public accounting firm of Peat,
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
80. 291 F. Supp. at 710.
81. 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1973).

82. Id. at 39.
83. Id. at 39-40.
84. Id. at 33-34.
85.

266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM). The Yale Express System, Inc.
hired PMM to audit its financial statements. Subsequently, Yale
used the figures certified by PMM to prepare its annual report to
shareholders as well as its Form 10-K filing with the SEC.8 6 Later,
while conducting "special studies '87 for Yale, PMM learned that
certain of the figures which it certified were misleading. It did not
disclose this information either to the SEC or to the public until
the special study had been completed approximately six months
later. During the course of PMM's special study, Yale announced
to PMM its intention to issue several interim statements to shareholders. PMM advised Yale that the figures derived from the special studies could not be used as a basis for these statements and
recommended that Yale use figures developed through its own internal accounting procedures. Yale accordingly issued interim statements based upon figures not compiled, audited, or certified by
PMM. These interim statements were later shown to be materially
false and misleading.
Plaintiffs, shareholders of Yale, brought a class action alleging
that PMM was liable for damages caused to them through PMM's
failure to disclose both that the certified statements in the annual
report were false and materially misleading and that the interim
statements were incorrect. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs'
claims. The district court held that the allegations with respect to
annual report liability were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.88 The court then turned to the allegations dealing with Yale's
interim statements. Plaintiffs argued that PMM aided and abetted
Yale's alleged rule lOb-5 violation by recommending the release of
Yale's own figures rather than those developed by PMM during its
special studies and by remaining silent while knowing that the
interim reports were false and misleading. The court indicated that
PMM had no separate duty to disclose that the figures in Yale's
interim statements were misleading.8 9 Absent such a duty, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was based solely
on PMM's silence and inaction. However, the court could not hold
as a matter of law that PMM's knowing recommendation and sanc86. A Form 10-K filing must be made annually with the SEC by qualifying
issuers of securities pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1970).
87. 266 F. Supp. at 183.
88. Id. at 194.
89. Id. at 195-97.
The court discussed and distinguished Pettit v.
American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), where such a duty was imposed.
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tion of the figures used in the interim statements-statements constituting a breach of Yale's duty to its investors-did not amount
to substantial assistance of that breach. 90 The court denied defendant's motion and remanded the case for trial.91
Accountant liability under rule lOb-5 was also considered in
Wessel v. Buhler.92 The case involved investors who had purchased
stock of Rocky Mountain Chemical Corporation in reliance upon
prospectuses prepared by the president of that corporation, L.M.
Buhler. Buhler had hired N.A. Jordan, an independent certified
public accountant, to prepare financial statements for Rocky Mountain. When preparing the statements, two of which were unaudited,
Jordan learned that Rocky Mountain's corporate records were seriously deficient and that certain listed accounts were of dubious
credibility.
Plaintiffs presented two theories of liability under rule lOb-5.
They alleged that Jordan's statements themselves were misleading
statements made "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" and that Jordan knew or should have known that the misleading statements were used in the preparation of prospectuses.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that the district
court had properly directed a verdict in Jordan's favor.93 The court
found that Jordan's statements were not made in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. 94 Treating plaintiffs alternate theory
of liability, aid and abetment of Buhler's rule lOb-5 violation, the
court refused to impose a duty of disclosure on Jordan.95 Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co.'s participation in Fischer consisted of failure to correct misleading statements made to investors and to the
SEC as well as advising and recommending the issuance of misleading interim statements. Here, plaintiffs failed to show that Jordan
directly participated in the preparation of the prospectuses; they
90. 266 F. Supp. at 197, citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
91. 266 F. Supp. at 197.
92. 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
93. Id. at 283.
94. Id. at 281-82.
95. Id. at 283. The court indicated that the only reference made with respect
to ihaction is contained in rule lOb-5(2) "providing that it is unlawful 'to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ...not misleading'." Id. The court then added that an omission nonetheless would be tied to affirmative statements made by accountants and others:
We perceive no reason, consonant with the congressional purpose in enacting
the Securities and [sic] Exchange Act of 1934, thus to expand Rule lOb-5
On the contrary, the exposure of independent accountants
liability ....
and others to such vistas of liability, limited only by the ingenuity of investors
and their counsel, would lead to serious mischief.
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argued that Jordan participated indirectly by aiding and abetting
their preparation. It is clear in both Wessel and Fischer that the
defendant accountants possessed special skills which gave them the
ability to know that statements made to investors were materially
misleading. The court, however, refused to tie Jordan's knowledge to
Buhler's rule lOb-5 violation by finding participation in the form of
an independent duty of disclosure owed to the investor.
In Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 96 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit declined to impose liability under rule lOb-5 where directors
of BarChris Construction Corporation, also a partner in Drexel &
Co., a brokerage and investment banking firm, failed to convey all
material, adverse information to prospective purchasers of BarChris
stock. 97 The defendant director, Coleman, had not participated in
the negotiation of sale in which the alleged violations were made,
nor did he make any representations himself or have knowledge of
representations made by other members of the board. Plaintiffs!
theory of liability centered around section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.98 The court, finding that Coleman had not
participated in the transaction, looked to the facts and examined the
relationship between the parties, the defendant's access to information, and his role in conducting the affairs of the corporation. The
court concluded that:
[A] director in his capacity as a director (a non-participant
in the transaction) owes no duty to insure all material, adverse information is conveyed to prospective purchasers of
the stock of the corporation on whose board he sits. A director's liability under Rule lOb-5 can thus only be secondary, such as that of an aider and abettor ....
The court went on to hold that Coleman was not an aider-abettor
of the rule lOb-5 violation.' 00 The court set a minimum standard
for liability under the rule by requiring more than a mere negligent
omission as a basis for liability imposed on outside directors.
Where plaintiffs sought to charge the defendant with aiding and
abetting, the court retained a standard of knowing assistance or
facilitation of the primary wrongdoing, saying:
We recognize that participation by a director in the dissemination of false information calculated to influence the
investing public may subject such a director to liability under the Rule. But it is quite a different matter to hold a
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1289.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970), quoted at note 79 supra.
479 F.2d at 1289.
Id.
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director liable in damages for failing to insure that all
material, adverse information is conveyed to prospective
purchasers of the company's stock absent substantial participation in the concealment or knowledge of it. Absent
knowledge or substantial participation we have refused to
impose such affirmative duties of disclosure upon Rule lOb-5
defendants.' 01
Judge Hays dissented in part, stating that he would hold Coleman
primarily liable under rule lOb-5 for a negligent failure to state material facts. 10 2 He indicated that, in the context of this case, the
distinction between outside and inside directors was irrelevant and
that as a director Coleman had a duty to keep himself informed
about all the activities of the corporation. Moreover, Judge Hays
was convinced that section 20(a) was designed to apply to the relationship between Coleman10 and
Drexel & Co. as well as to the transac3
case.
this
in
involved
tion
Strong v. France'04 arose when one Fraley induced the plaintiff
to invest money in Sportscaster, Inc., a corporation which he was
promoting. Fraley hoped the corporation would operate a closedcircuit radio broadcast system at sporting events. The defendants
France and the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing
(NASCAR) agreed to support and promote the corporation; however, neither had any contract or communication with the plaintiff,
nor were they aware of the representations made by Fraley. Plaintiff advanced four theories of liability: (1) that France was liable
as a director of Sportscaster, (2) that France and NASCAR as
promoters of Sportscaster were liable for false representations made
to the plaintiff, (3) that defendants aided and abetted a violation
of rule lOb-5, and (4) that defendants were liable as controlling
persons under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. Affirming the district
court's ruling to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit found that the facts alleged by the plaintiff
failed to support liability under any of the theories presented. 0 5 It
was clear that neither defendant had knowledge of Fraley's misrepresentations. The court indicated that the facts would not support a
duty of disclosure and that neither defendant had engaged in activity which might provide a basis for the imposition of aider-abettor
liability.'0 6 In addition, the court stated that the alleged facts gave
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1318-20.
474 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 753.
Id. at 752.
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no indication that the defendants acted in bad faith or directly or
indirectly induced Fraley's fraudulent conduct. 107 This precluded
liability under section 20(a).
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,'0° Dobich
Securities Corporation was engaged in trading the stock of the defendant, Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., which was acting
as its own transfer agent. Michael Dobich, president of Dobich
Securities, was selling Midwestern stock that had not yet been issued by the corporation and was diverting the funds he received
for his own use. Although aware of Dobich's activities, Midwestern took no action, choosing neither to report Dobich to the SEC nor
to take other steps which might have stopped his fraudulent scheme.
Midwestern hoped to maintain the benefit of an active market in
its stock since it was in a potential merger situation and the inflated value of its stock caused by the active trading gave it a
better bargaining position. Plaintiffs, investors defrauded by Dobich who had allegedly failed to deliver almost $3 million worth of
Midwestern stock, charged Midwestern with aid and abetment of
Dobich's rule lOb-5 violation. Overruling the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the district court held that one may be accountable as an aider-abettor under rule lOb-5 when an affirmative
duty calls for disclosure and a party chooses to remain silent.'0 9
The opinion indicates that not everyone has such a duty. For
example, the court drew an analogy to nontrading parties who possess material inside information. Judge Eschbach noted that those
persons who are aware of material or crucial facts because of their
position as "insiders" must refrain from using this superior knowledge to the detriment of the investor." 0 Where a corporate insider
possesses special skills or abilities, as in the case of in-house accountants and attorneys, he may be charged with a duty of disclosure raised by his fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary status."' Disclosure may be justifiably expected by the investor in cases where he
must depend upon the superior knowledge or skills of the defendant. 1 2 In the context of aider-abettor liability under rule lOb-5,
107. Id.
108. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp.
702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on merits), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970).
109. 259 F. Supp. at 681.
110. Id. at 681-82.
111.
A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5, § 88.04, at 4-9 to 4-11 (1974).
112. See, e.g., Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973); Connelly v.
Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959), affd per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th
Cir. 1960).
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a nontrading insider's duty of disclosure raised by his status or special relationship with the investor is similar to the duty imposed
on insiders generally. The district court in Brennan subscribed to this
theory and found such a special relationship between the defendant
Affirming the decision,
Midwestern and investors in its securities.'
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit added that imposition
of this type of duty should be confined to a case-by-case determination as the particular facts dictate. 1 4 Midwestern's knowledge of
Dobich's scheme, its participation as a transfer agent, and the benefit it derived from the fraud established the basis for imposing the
duty.
Whether aider-abettor liability may be found absent some special
relationship or duty still remains an open question. 5 The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, indicated in Wessel v.
Buhler its hesitancy to expand rule lOb-5 in this way absent a clear
statutory intent 1 6 Accordingly, the argument that rule lOb-5 contemplates only affirmative conduct has not been completely abandoned." 7 The question remains: To what extent is the action or inaction of a defendant important? A leading commentator believes
that aiding and abetting liability based solely on a defendant's inaction, such as that imposed by the Brennan court, has "frightening
implications" and that "it may take benefit plus knowledge to justify
liability for an aider-abettor by silence and inaction."" 8 Another
commentator suggests that liability under the inaction doctrine
"seems wrong in the absence of special reasons imposing a separate duty to act."" 9
In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,' 20 knowledge was the issue of central
importance, the participation of the defendant being clear. This
was an injunctive action brought by the SEC in which the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit extended the negligence standard
to secondary participants charged as aiders and abettors, expressly
rejecting Professor Ruder's position that secondary liability for neg113. 259 F. Supp. at 681-82.
114. 417 F.2d at 155, citing Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th
Cir. 1963).
115. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5(533), at 208.25-.26 (1973);
A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lob-5 § 40.02, at 2-7 (1974); see, e.g., Wessel v.
Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 195-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
116. 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971).
117.

118.
119.

See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text.
2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5(533), at 208.25 (1973).

Ruder, Wheat & Loss, Standards of Conduct Under The FederalSecurities

Acts, 27 Bus. LAWYER 75, 80 (Special Issue 1972).

120.

489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in 87 HARV. L. REv. 1860 (1974).
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12
ligence would place too great a burden upon business activities. 1
The court found that the general desire to place stricter controls
on the securities industry outweighs the resulting restrictions on
business activities. 122 The decision is notable when compared to
the Ernst & Ernst decision because the role of an attorney in preparing an opinion letter bears a resemblance to that of a certified
public accountant conducting an audit.1 23 Pointing out that the investing public might justifiably depend upon an attorney's opinion
letter in the same way that it might rely upon an independent
accountant's financial statements, the court of appeals overturned
the ruling of the district court and imposed secondary liability for
negligence. 24 However, the court carefully emphasized that its decision should not provide the basis for applying a negligence standard to private damage actions or to those defendants more peripherally involved in illegal securities activities.125 The Spectrum
court held that negligence was sufficient to impose aider-abettor liability in the context of equitable, injunctive relief, but that it was
insufficient to justify the imposition of civil damages. The position
that a higher degree of culpability should be required for aiderabettor liability in civil damage actions is consistent with the view
taken by the most recent draft of the proposed Federal Securities
Code.126 The Spectrum decision, however, discounts the distinction
between primary and secondary involvement. The court instead
stresses the equitable nature of the relief sought and the important

121. 489 F.2d at 542.
122. Id. One objective of securities legislation has been to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure in the marketplace for the traditional doctrine of caveat emptor
and thereby achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). However, it
does not necessarily follow from this goal that the rule was intended to establish a
scheme of investor's insurance. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.
1965).
123. See Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371,
389; cf. Small, supra note 74, at 1191-92. But see Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws
Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAWYER 1153, 1162-64 (1972).
124. The Spectrum court said:
In assessing liability as an aider and abbettor, however, the district judge
formulated a requisite standard of culpability-actual knowledge of the improper scheme plus an intent to further that scheme-which we find to be a
sharp and unjustified departure from the negligence standard which we have
repeatedly held to be sufficient in the context of enforcement proceedings
seeking equitable or prophylactic relief.
489 F.2d at 541. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 811 (2d Cir.
1975).
125. Id. at 542.
126. Compare ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1704 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974), with ALl
FED. SEC. CODE § 1418(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
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public interest served by shifting to a negligence standard. 127 Also
emphasized is the high degree of reliance placed upon an attorneyprepared opinion letter by the investing public, a letter which is a

sine qua non to the distribution of unregistered securities.128 These
two considerations influenced the court to a considerable extent.
IV.

THE ACCOUNTANT'S DUTIES UNDER
RULE

17a-5

OF THE

1934 ACT

Rule 17a-5 and Form X-17A-5 define the scope of an accountant's duty of inquiry under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act. 1 29 The
rule specifies that the accountant perform the audit in accordance
127. The Sixth Circuit made this comment with respect to the Spectrum decision and cast some doubt on the proposition that liability was in fact imposed for
negligence:
as correct on its facts.
We view the Second Circuit's decision ...
There a lawyer was aware that his misleading opinion letter could be used
to sell unregistered securities and failed to take timely steps to prevent such
use. . . . We note further that the attorney in Spectrum, Ltd. had committed
three prior securities law violations, so that his argument of innocent knowledge was subject to doubt.
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 n.30 (6th Cir. 1974).
128. 489 F.2d at 542.
129. Plaintiffs in the Ernst & Ernst case also alleged that Ernst & Ernst was under
a duty of inquiry requiring them to detect and report noncompliance with rule 27 of
Article III of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD). NASD rule 27 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Each member shall establish, maintain and enforce written procedures
which will enable it to supervise properly the activities of each registered
representative and associated person to assure compliance with applicable
securities laws, rules, regulations and statements of policy promulgated
thereunder and with the rules of this association.
(b) Final responsibility for proper supervision shall rest with the member
(c) Each member shall be responsible for keeping and preserving appropriate records for carrying out the member's supervisory procedures.
Each member shall review and endorse in writing on an internal record, all
transactions and all correspondence of its registered representative pertaining to the solicitation or execution of any securities transaction.
CCH NASD MANUAL
2177 (1974). Similar contentions were successfully raised
by claimants in SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of the propriety of this decision, see Comment, Civil Liabilityfor Violation of
NASD Rules- SEC v. First Securities Co., 121 U. PA. L. REV. 388. But see Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974).
In Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, defrauded investors argued that inquiry into a
broker-dealer's compliance with NASD rules falls within the ambit of an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards. This contention
is not entirely devoid of merit since the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) notes in its industry audit guide that an auditor should be familiar
with NASD rules. The AICPA gives the following warning:
In addition to a familiarity with the above rules of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, it is necessary for the independent public accountant
to have a working knowledge of Regulations T and U of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and, if his client is a member of
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with generally accepted accounting standards. This means that he
must test the adequacy of internal accounting controls as well as
make inquiry into other factors which reflect the accuracy and reliability of a broker-dealer's financial statements. Keeping in mind
that the investing public relies on statements made by an independent public accountant, courts have found this type of duty else3
where. 30 The accounting profession itself has similar standards.' 1
The Ernst & Ernst court set the standard of care with which an accountant must comply as that standard which generally prevails in
32
the accounting profession at the time the audit was conducted.
This position is consistent with general principles of tort law.' 3 3 In
contrast, however, is Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Kreckstein, Horwath
& Horwath,3 4 where the court imposed primary liability under rule
lOb-5 even though a defendant accountant complied with the professional standards in the community and with generally accepted accounting principles. The court stated: "Our inquiry is properly focused not on whether Laventhol's report satisfies esoteric accounting norms, comprehensible only to the initiate, but whether the report fairly presents the true financial position of Firestone . . . to
' 35
the untutored eye of an ordinary investor." 1
a stock exchange or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., he
should be familiar with the pertinent rules of those organizations.
AMERICAN

INSTITUTE

OF

CERTIFIED

PUBLIC

ACCOUNTANTS,

AUDITS

OF

BROKERS

AND DEALERS IN SECURITIES 3 (1973). The Ernst & Ernst court drew attention to
this fact. 503 F.2d at 1113. However, recalling its holding in Hochfelder v. Midwest
Stock Exch., supra, and its hesitancy to place the enforcement of the rules of a selfregulating organization in the hands of others, the court found that a fair reading of
Form X-17A-5 and rule 17a-5 supplies no authority supporting such a duty. 503
F.2d at 1112. It also should be noted that the Midwest Stock Exchange conducted
no audits of First Securities while both Ernst & Ernst and the NASD did. The Ernst
& Ernst court added that noncompliance with NASD rules would tend to undermine
the accountant's ability to represent fairly the financial condition of the brokerdealer, but they refused to impose an "unascertainable and everchanging duty" absent authority from the common law or clear obligations created by the profession or
statute. Id. at 1113.
130. E.g., Caddell v. Goodbody & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 93, 938 (N.D. Ala. 1972). In the Caddell case the court said: "The rule to be
drawn from the cases concerning liability of accountants is that an accountant, knowing that the investing public relies on financial statements, has a duty to fairly represent a company's financial position in accord with generally accepted accounting
standards." Id. at 93,740.
131. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AUDITS OF
BROKERS AND DEALERS IN SECURITIES 63-71 (1973).
132. 503 F.2d at 1108.
133. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 161 (4th ed. 1971).
134. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,574 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
135. Id. at 95,998. See Hawes, Truth in Financial Statements: An Introduction, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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The second of an accountant's duties under rule 17a-5, a duty of
disclosure, is the logical corollary to the duty of inquiry imposed
by the rule. The Ernst & Ernst court pointed out that if it can be

said that Ernst & Ernst breached its statutory duty of inquiry, then
under the circumstances there would also be a breach of the duty of
disclosure. 36 Rule 17a-5 specifically requires that when an auditor
departs from generally accepted accounting standards, he must make
a statement to that effect.137 Aside from this specific provision,
the court noted that a duty of inquiry necessarily implies that any
material inadequacies discovered as a result of the inquiry will be

disclosed. This contention finds support in the rule which provides
that any matters to which the accountant takes exception must be
clearly and specifically stated. 3 8 The accounting profession also
139
contemplates that a disclosure will occur as a result of the audit.

In addition, a general duty to the investing public may require that
an accountant disclose any information which may injure investors.' 40 The Ernst & Ernst court notes that at a minimum it would
be incumbent on Ernst & Ernst to disclose1 41that the audit departed
from generally accepted auditing standards.
In an article discussing the various duties placed upon public
accountants working in the securities field, one commentator notes

that the SEC has not provided specific guidelines for the accounting profession to

follow.14 2

Rule 17a-5 must be considered an excep-

136. 503 F.2d at 1114.
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(g)(2)(B) (1974).
138. Id. § 240.17a-5(i). The SEC makes it clear that disclosure is expected:
"The Audit Requirements have been expanded to require the independent public
accountant to comment on any material inadequacies found to exist in the accounting
systems, the internal accounting control, and procedures for safekeeping securities
and to report corrective action taken or proposed." SEC Exchange Act Release No.
8172 (Oct. 3, 1967).
139. The AICPA presently notes in its industry audit guide:
In compliance with generally accepted auditing standards, as well as the
rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the principal national
securities exchanges, the independent public accountant is required to review
and make appropriate tests of the accounting system, internal accounting
control, and procedure for safeguarding securities for the period since the
prior examination date. If, based on his review and tests of compliance, no
material inadequacies are found to exist with respect to any of the foregoing
matters, the independent public accountant should so state in his report on
internal control. If, however, material inadequacies are found to exist his
report should disclose the nature of the inadequacies and the constructive
action proposed to be taken or already taken by the brokerage concern.
AMERICAN

INSTITUTE

OF CERTIFIED

140.
141.
142.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,

AUDITS

OF BROKERS

70-71 (1973).
See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
503 F.2d at 1114.
Isbell, An Overview of Accountant's Duties and Liabilities Under the
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tion. The standards applicable to auditing broker-dealers in securities are clearly laid out in Form X-17A-5. However, it is argued
that these requirements initially reflect an obligation on the brokerdealer and cannot be said to hold the accounting profession to obligations other than those created by the audit contract.1 43 Thus, if
the premise is accepted, it follows that the statute does not give
rise to a duty of inquiry or disclosure by the accountant; only a
common law duty arises which the investor cannot enforce. The
viability of this theory in light of past decisions under rule lOb-5
is at best tenuous. Certainly, the SEC may be expected to require
inquiry by accountants and to enjoin future violation if inquiry does
not take place.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit, in the Ernst & Ernst case, attempted to cast
the defendant's activity into the aiding and abetting mold. Since
Ernst & Ernst allegedly violated its duty of inquiry and disclosure,
the best approach would have been to consider the activity as a direct violation of rule lOb-5. Plaintiffs alleged that Ernst & Ernst
negligently prepared financial statements required under rule 17a-5.
These statements were then presented to the SEC 44 which, because
the statements were defective, failed to discover or prevent the fraud.
An accountant who misrepresents a broker-dealer's financial condition becomes a direct participant in activity prohibited under the
rule. 45 Where a duty of disclosure is owed to the investing public,
failure to inquire accompanied by a subsequent failure to disclose
that inquiry was not made may provide a proper basis on which to
impose civil liability; the cause of action need not be pressed into
the aiding and abetting mold. The Ernst & Ernst court based its
Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIO ST. L. J.
261, 269 (1974).
143. Id.
144. Rule 17a-5 now provides that the SEC shall make the Form X-17A-5 report available for public inspection whenever the auditor has commented on material
inadequacies found to exist in the accounting system, internal accounting control,
procedures for safeguarding securities, or the procedures followed in complying with
rule 17a-13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(m)(3) (1974). In addition, Ernst & Ernst's negligence in not discovering Nay's fraud could be represented by the absence of a contingent liability claim by defrauded investors on the assets of First Securities Co.
Thus, figures used in statements now sent directly to customers under the rule would
be defective. Id. § 240.17a-5(n).
145. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,574 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
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holding on the most restrictive rationale available: an accounting
firm which certifies an audit of a broker-dealer in securities has an
explicit statutory duty to investigate and disclose properly any material information acquired. Except for this newly imposed statutory
duty of inquiry, the court adds little to the development of rule
lOb-5. The only unique feature of the decision is the court's characterization of the offense as derivative rather than primary. Perhaps this is only because the defendant's deception was practiced
indirectly on the public enforcer, rather than by misrepresentations
communicated directly to the investor. However, a finding of causation is appropriate where Ernst & Ernst's conduct served to incapacitate an enforcement body, preventing it from protecting the
investing public. When looking to the duty which an accountant
owes under rule lOb-5, attempts to compartmentalize his conduct
into primary or derivative categories only confuse the issue. 46 In
addition, compartmentalization of conduct actionable under rule
lOb-5 provides an undesirable immunity for defrauders, since it requires not only a primary wrong but also a primary violator. Yet,
given the common law's scheme of layers of liability, the duty imposed on Ernst & Ernst would clearly subject it to liability under
rule lOb-5 without the necessity of locating a primary violator, had
the misrepresentations been made directly to the defrauded investors.
The trend to increase the responsibilities of those on the fringes
of securities transactions may be considered as the result of a general desire to broaden the remedies available to the defrauded investor and to provide an incentive for full disclosure. As Ernst &
Ernst and the other cases discussed illustrate, tort notions of lossshifting and risk-spreading 147 help generate the momentum for
broadened civil remedies under rule lOb-5.148 Perhaps the wellknown foreseeability rule in tort law provides the ultimate bound146. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
147. For a discussion of these theories, see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Smith, Frolicand Detour,
23 CoLum. L. REv. 444, 456-60 (1923).
148. For example, in Rusch Factors v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968),
where plaintiff corporation sought recovery for damages sustained when it relied on
financial statements which allegedly were prepared in a negligent manner by the
defendant accountant, the court asked:
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden
of an accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more
easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming public?
Id. at 91.
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ary of an accountant's duty under the rule. 14 9 The increased
malleability of the aider-abettor doctrine in securities law as well as
the rejection by some courts of the compartmentalized approach to
liability under rule lOb-5 has allowed "deep-pocket" claimants to
gain a strong foothold in the courts. 50
It is unfortunate that the Ernst & Ernst court chose not to analyze
the case in terms of Ernst & Ernst's knowledge and participation in
the fraud and the duty imposed by its special skills and relationship
with the investing public. In fact, the issue of scienter was never
discussed explicitly by the court. Rather, the court answered the
difficult questions surrounding derivative liability under rule lOb-5
by the application of a statute. The court drew both the duties
of inquiry and disclosure from the 1934 Act. Failure to disclose
was not an issue in the case because the statute deals with reporting documents and an undertaking of disclosure, albeit misleading
in this instance. Similarly, Ernst & Ernst's duty of disclosure to investors arose because it certified those reporting documents. Its
level of participation in the fraud was supplied by the statute.
This statutory approach, when coupled with the retention of a
compartmentalized analysis using inappropriate standards, does
nothing to further the understanding of liability imposed under rule
lOb-5. Civil liability under rule lOb-5 should arise only from a
careful analysis which examines the extent of a defendant's participation in the prohibited activity as well as his level of knowledge.
Replacing the elements of participation and knowledge with the imposition of a statutory duty only begs the question.
ALAN C. PORTER
149. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100
(1928). But see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
In Rusch Factors v. Levin, the court suggested "that the decision in Ultramares
constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that '[t]he risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed'." 284 F. Supp. at 91, citing Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
150. Note, Securities Regulation-Attorney's Liability-Advising, Abetting, and
the SEC's National Student Marketing Offensive, 50 TEx. L. RaV. 1265, 1269 n.23
(1972).

